

Negotiating with Communists: A Test Case

From the speech of Senator Thomas J. Dodd to the Senate, February 21, 1963:

The record of the United States . . . at Geneva, since the inception of the test ban negotiations, reveals a consistent and continuing retreat from the basic principles of inspection. . . .

Let me summarize briefly the many critical concessions we have made before Soviet intransigence since we first embarked on the test ban negotiations.

Our initial act of trust in the Soviet Union was the unpoliced nuclear test moratorium on which we embarked in September 1958. . . .

A second vital concession . . . [was agreeing to] a basic formula for detection and inspection which took it for granted that both parties would act in good faith, once the moratorium was superseded by a formal treaty. . . .

Our third concession was our agreement to extend the test ban treaty to cover tests, in space and underground, that cannot possibly be verified.

In December 1961 we made a fourth major concession to the Soviets. We agreed to merge the test ban negotiations with the negotiations on general disarmament; . . . instead of attempting to settle the issue through a conference of the three great nuclear powers, the question of the test ban was now submitted to the judgment of an eighteen-nation conference, which included five Western nations, five Communist nations and eight neutral nations.

Our fifth concession had to do with the size of the detection network. Our original position at Geneva in 1958 called for an international network of 600 to 650 monitoring stations. We compromised on 180 stations worldwide, with 21 in the territory of the Soviet Union. At Geneva last August we informed the Russians that we were willing to consider a substantial reduction in the number of monitoring stations . . . Ambassador Dean said . . . "something like 80." . . .

As our sixth concession, we have indicated that we are willing to limit on-site inspections to a very small number per annum. . . . At the first Geneva Conference [1958], our representatives initially held out for on-site inspections of all undetermined seismic events above the magnitude of five kilotons, and of 20 per cent of the shocks below this level. In 1961 we offered to reduce the quota of on-site inspections to 20 per annum. During the summer of last year it was several times indicated that we might be willing to agree to twelve on-site inspections per annum. [We have now reduced our figure to seven, and have suggested we might go even lower.] . . .

Concession No. 7 had to do with the organization and functioning of the control commission. Not only did we accept the principle of parity for the Communist and non-Communist nations on the Commission, but we agreed to give the Soviets veto power over the appointment of the Executive Officer. . . .

We have made the removal of the Executive Officer virtually impossible by proposing that . . . a decision to remove him would require the concurring votes of eleven members of the Commission. This was concession No. 8.

Concession No. 9 . . . played down the importance of inspection by stipulating that the Executive Officer shall "be guided by the considerations that the permanent staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary to perform its assigned functions." In line with this we [eliminated] . . . all mention of the need for a joint scientific program for the purpose of improving methods of detection and verification.

Our tenth concession was graver. In our proposals of last August 27 we compromised our position further by completely eliminating the so-called threshold of detection that is the dividing line between underground tests big enough to be identified and those that are too small to be identified by current methods. . . .

Our eleventh concession had to do with the duration of an unpoliced moratorium on undetectable underground tests if a formal treaty banning nuclear tests were signed. . . . In our proposal of August 27, 1962 we have agreed in advance that, on the day a treaty is signed, tests of all sizes, detectable or not, would be forbidden.

In the recent negotiations we have accepted the principle that much of the job of monitoring can be taken over by sealed black boxes. . . . This . . . can only be justified on the alternative assumptions, either that completely tamperproof black boxes can, through some miracle, be devised by technologists, or that the Soviets would in no way attempt to interfere with the boxes or with transmission from the boxes or with periodic inspections of the black box network. . . . This was our twelfth concession to guilelessness.

Finally, we have made a serious concession to the preposterous principle of national inspection. Our draft treaty of August 27, 1962 stipulates . . . that the monitoring stations . . . "shall be maintained and manned by nationals of the states in whose territory such station is located." If this principle is ever translated into reality, it will be tantamount to creating a situation in which the Russians are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether or not they are cheating and whether or not to convey this information to us.

and radio broadcasters), widely read commentators and flattered editors, publishers and network moguls in particular, the project is much more accurately identified by the phrase 'managing the news.' From which Mr. Krock draws the sorry conclusion: "For any degree to which this project has been successful the principal onus rests on the printed and electronic press itself."

It may then be added, conversely: the principal force that could most quickly unmanage the Washington news is that same printed and electronic press. It was once assumed to be the business of the press to seek out and unearth the news, no matter how remotely hidden nor how many risks had to be run in the search. It is not impossible to get a reasonably accurate idea of what goes on in Washington—and Katanga, too, for that matter—however adroitly or brutally the Administration tries to fend off prying eyes. But it cannot be done by a press content to rewrite official handouts, repeat official leaks, and relit White House boots.

Trial Run in California

In the recent conventions of the California Young Republicans and Republican Assembly, the anti-conservative faction tried out a new smear tactic. Robert Gaston, who was elected president of the Young Republicans, and Harry Waddell, who was narrowly (273-212) defeated for president of the Assembly, were the conservative leaders. Neither is a member of the John Birch Society, but both got the support of JBS delegates when it came to a showdown against the anti-conservatives. Both, naturally, "accepted" the JBS support, as every practical politician accepts backing where he can find it, short of treason and mayhem. Indeed, how can backing be "refused," even if not wanted?

The tactic of the anti-conservatives, both within the California GOP and throughout much of the national press, was to label Gaston and Waddell "Birch-backed" and "Birch-supported," figuring that these phrases would bring—by association—the negative reaction to "Birch" that two years of all-out propaganda have implanted in many minds.

It is a lame enough device in itself, and will probably play out before too long; for there are enough JBS members of enough different shades to make it likely that there will be some JBS support for virtually any anti-Communist or conservative movement. If the anti-conservative press insists on this tactic, it will wind up calling everything to the right of Americans for Democratic Action "Birch-backed," and the comment may end up being accepted by the general public as a reassuring endorsement.

For the Record

Congressman Johansen (R., Mich.) points out that the one question histrionic Secretary of Defense McNamara couldn't answer was: how many Soviet missiles were carried into Cuba and how many removed during a period of several weeks when weather conditions prevented aerial surveillance? . . . Usually reliable Washington sources say accurate figure of Soviet troops in Cuba is 38,000, by Administration's own (but closely guarded) intelligence estimates. . . . They say number of other Iron and Bamboo Curtain citizens now operating in Cuba is still higher. . . . Reason why President Kennedy had to get some assurance of Soviet troop withdrawals by March 15 was to take steam out of insistence by Caribbean leaders that something drastic be done about Castro—and fast. JFK is scheduled to meet with the anti-Castro hards (Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) on March 18. . . . Capitol Hill wiseacres remarking that Cuba has escalated into hot war after all—between President Kennedy and the press.

Administration tax reform proposals that have effect of limiting amount individuals can contribute to churches and deduct from taxable income have set off avalanche of mail. Churches of all faiths are organizing letter-writing campaigns, making liberal use of slogan "Render unto Caesar." . . . By lopsided vote (12 to 1), House Rules Committee has killed this year's drive to kill House Committee on Un-American Activities (Dissenter: Rep. Richard Bolling, Missouri Democrat). . . . HUAC supporters cheered that Rep. John Ashbrook, a bright young GOP conservative from Ohio, has been placed on Committee. . . . Intelligence sources anxious to get look-see at post-Oct. 22 Khrushchev letters to Kennedy, but White House refuses to release them on the usual security excuse. . . . Congress not the least bit happy over disclosure that \$200,000 of U.S. taxpayers' money has been used by UN propagandists to "improve the image" of the shaky Adoula government in the Congo.

Seasonal note: For first time in recorded history Lake Superior (400 miles long, 100 miles wide) is frozen over from shore to shore.